After a few mental missteps documented by previous blog posts (here and there), this is what I think of as a pretty reasonable approach to packet encryption in the Assimilation Project. Although those two posts are now obsolete, the background post I wrote is still relevant. I’ve learned a lot about crypto in the process […]
In this article, we talk in more detail about the Assimilation Project’s reliable UDP protocol, our decision to avoid session keys, factors influencing our initial choice of crypto libraries, and touch on key revocation. So, like before we’re looking forward to your comments on our design choices. Like before, grab your thinking cap, sit down with your crypto buddies and think hard about what we’ve done.
This article outlines our approach to keys and key management given our unique problems in a pragmatic and effective way. Although we will use crypto libraries with well-proven algorithms, we will use them in slightly unconventional ways. So, get your crypto buddies, grab a beverage (adult or otherwise), put on your thinking cap, and think hard about how we’re planning on approaching these challenges. Although I’ve tried to think all this through, I’m not a crypto expert – which is why I’m asking for your help.
Since its inception, the open source Assimilation project has been concerned with security, and paranoid at every opportunity. Like a lot of software, it has serious security concerns. On the one hand, our nanoprobes run on every server in the enterprise and exercise root privileges – creating a potentially dangerous attack surface. On the other hand, we incrementally create a high-value database which has fine-grained and up-to-date information about everything in the environment – software versions, ports, services, IP addresses and MAC addresses, known security vulnerabilities – a veritable treasure map for an attacker. This article details why cryptography is essential for communication in this environment, and some unique aspects of the problem we’re solving that affect how we use it. It is our hope our readers (this means you!) will give us a thorough flogging^H^H^H^H^H^H^H review of how we use cryptography in our software in this article and the next.
